This paper explores the impact of school district consolidation on house values based on house sales in upstate New York State from 2000 to 2012. By combining propensity score matching and double-sales data to compare house value changes in consolidating and comparable school districts, we find that, except in one relatively large district, consolidation has a negative impact on house values during the years right after it occurs and that this effect then fades away and is eventually reversed. This pattern suggests that it takes time either for the advantages of consolidation to be apparent or for the people who prefer consolidated districts to move in. Finally, as in previous studies, the long-run impacts of consolidation on house values are positive in census tracts that initially have low incomes, but negative in high-income census tracts, where parents may have a relatively large willingness to retain the non-budgetary advantages of small districts.
Introduction
Over the past century, the many small school districts that were established as this nation was settled have gradually been consolidated, and the number of districts has been cut by almost 90 percent (National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 2006 , 2011 . Despite this dramatic change, many states still contain several school districts with enrollment below 500 pupils, which are good candidates for consolidation. The principal justification for consolidation is economies of scale in the provision of public education, which have been documented by many studies (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002; Duncombe and Yinger 2007) . School district consolidation, however, may also have negative impacts on education quality by affecting student motivation, parental involvement in schools, or parental access to teachers. Moreover, the cost and quality of public schools may influence the attraction of a community to potential residents and thereby affect local property values (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011) . This paper combines these two issues by examining the impact of consolidation on housing prices, that is, by determining whether the market value of single family houses goes up or down when consolidation occurs. Building on previous research by Brasington (2004) and Hu and Yinger (2008) , we examine the impact of recent consolidations on housing prices in New York State.
An investigation into the property value impact of consolidation provides information about the way home buyers view consolidation and therefore contributes to the debate about state policies that affect school district size. Despite extensive consolidation in the past, some states still provide incentives to consolidate. Several states, including New York, have aid programs to encourage district "reorganization," which usually means consolidation (NCES 2001) .
Transportation or building aid formulas also encourage consolidation in some cases (Haller and Monk 1988) . Surprisingly, however, these pro-consolidation policies may be accompanied by policies that discourage consolidation, such as operating aid formulas that compensate school districts for small enrollment or for small enrollment per square mile (Huang 2004 ). This paper reviews the literature on consolidation, with a focus on the impact of consolidation on property values, describes the data and methods we employ, and presents the results from our estimation. A final section presents our conclusions.
Literature Review
In principle, consolidation enables school districts to benefit from economies of scale, obtain new aid from state government, and provide students with more course options.
According to the New York State Department of Education (NYSED, 2013) , more than 30 school district consolidations have taken place in New York State since 1980. Regardless of potential cost savings, however, school district consolidation is sometimes difficult to achieve.
Consolidation may increase travel time for students and therefore impose additional transportation costs on households (Kenny 1982) . Residents may fear a loss of local identity or worry that their own community is not compatible with potential partner districts (NYSED 2013) . Moreover, high-income households are less likely to support consolidation, perhaps because they place a high value on personal contact with teachers or good access to schools and school activities (Duncombe and Yinger 2007; Hu and Yinger 2008) . In addition, students in larger school districts may have weaker connections to the school community, a less positive attitude toward school, and a lower motivation to learn (Cotton 1996; Barker and Gump 1964; Duncombe and Yinger 2007) . Finally, consolidation may raise concerns about representation on the Board of Education or about whether the new district will operate as expected (NYSED 2013) . These possibilities help to explain why some consolidation propositions failed to pass in New York, even when the districts involved are relatively comparable.
Several scholars have written about the determinants of consolidation (Brasington 1999 (Brasington , 2003 Gordon and Knight 2006) and about the impacts of consolidation on the cost of education (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002; Duncombe and Yinger 2007) . This literature indicates that districts with widely disparate characteristics, such as property values, are unlikely to choose to consolidate. Brasington (2003, p. 687 ) also finds that "greater differences in income and racial composition discourage consolidation." When two small districts do consolidate, however, they are likely to experience some adjustment costs but to save money overall because of economies of scale. Duncombe and Yinger find that these economies are considerably smaller in percentage terms for two consolidating districts with 1,500 pupils each than for two 500-pupil districts.
Recent articles by Brasington (2004) and Hu and Yinger (2008) explore the propertyvalue impact of consolidation. Property value impacts reflect cost savings, but also raise additional issues because they may reflect parental concerns that do not appear in school districts' budgets, such as parental access to teachers or the time parents and students spend getting to school. Indeed, Brasington finds that once one controls for changes in student test scores and property tax rates, consolidation has a negative impact on property values.
Hu and Yinger provide an accounting of the channels through which consolidation affects house values. The first broad channel reflects changes in the quality of local public services.
Consolidation leads to increases in state aid to education and, due to economies of scale, it leads to a decline in the marginal cost of public services. Both of these impacts give voters an incentive to demand higher school quality. The impact of each additional unit of school quality on house value is weighted by the difference between the marginal benefits it provides and the taxes it requires. The second broad channel reflects changes in the cost of providing existing school services. This channel has four parts. First, consolidation may raise the cost of off-budget services, such as parental access to teachers or the time it takes students to get to school. Second, consolidation may lead to economies of scale, which means that it may result in a lower cost per pupil to provide the same level of school services. Third, consolidation may involve adjustment costs, such as re-organizing staff or re-designing bus routes. Fourth, consolidation brings in state aid. The first and third parts are likely to have a negative impact on house values, whereas the second and fourth are likely to have a positive impact.
The empirical work by Hu and Yinger, which is based on census tracts in New York State, finds that the impact of consolidation on house values depends on the enrollment change associated with consolidation. As expected from the literature on economies of scale, the property value impacts are largest for the smallest consolidating districts, and positive impacts fade out once a district size of about 1,000 pupils is reached. Hu and Yinger also show that all the impacts of consolidation on property values are weighted by house value. This theoretical prediction is upheld in their empirical work, which finds that consolidation has a strong positive impact on house values in census tracts with low average house values and a strong negative impact where average house value is high. One final lesson from previous studies is that one must be careful to recognize that changes in property values over time may reflect both changes in the value people place on the school services they receive in each district and changes in household sorting across school districts (Figlio and Lucas 2004 , Bogin 2011 , Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011 . Households that strongly prefer the access to teachers they receive in a small district, for example, may leave a school district when it consolidates. As a result, changes in house values when a district consolidates reflect some combination of changes in the willingness to pay of people with the same income and preferences as those originally in the community and changes in the types of people who decide to move there. One way to estimate the impact of consolidation on housing prices is to use a sample of house sales over time to estimate a hedonic regression with house value as the dependent variable and with an indicator variable equal to one in districts where consolidation has occurred. The most obvious problem with this approach is that the decision to consolidate may be influenced by unobserved factors that also influence house value. Brasington (2004) addresses this problem using spatial statistics; Hu and Yinger (2008) use an instrumental variables procedure. An alternative approach to this endogeneity problem, which is used in this paper, is to focus on the change in price for houses that sell twice. This difference-in-difference approach compares the change in housing prices in districts that consolidate between sales to the change in housing prices in districts that did not consolidate. As a result, all time-invariant factors that influence the decision to consolidate are differenced out. This approach does not account for time-varying factors that might influence consolidation, but, as discussed in detail by Duncombe and Yinger (2007) , consolidation is a long process in New York State and short-run changes are unlikely to influence the consolidation decision.
A limitation of these studies is that the districts that consolidate and the houses they contain may be systematically different from other districts (and their houses). Under these circumstances, a comparison of house sales in treatment (i.e. consolidating) and control (nonconsolidating) districts may yield biased results whenever the impact of consolidation depends on district or house traits. This problem can be addressed using a propensity score matching (PSM) estimator, which accounts for the possibility that the impact of consolidation depends on district and house characteristics. With this approach, the first step is to estimate a series of propensity score regressions, which predict the probability that a house sale with certain housing and district traits will be in a district that consolidates. When combined with a weighting scheme, each regression can then be used to select a comparison sample, that is, a set of observations in districts that did not consolidate that are otherwise equivalent to the observations in consolidating districts. Each comparison sample can then be examined with a series of balancing tests to determine whether the distributions of the explanatory variables are similar in "treatment" and "comparison" samples. If they are, then the possibility of bias from an interaction between "treatment" and explanatory variables is minimal. Details of our differencing and matching procedures are presented below.
Data and Measures
The data used in this analysis come from two sources. Property sales information and 1 Property transfer reports are filed with the County Clerk and forwarded to NYDTF. The Sales database includes information on property location, class, sales date, and sales price. We include in this analysis only arms-length transactions of 1-to-3 unit family homes, constructed for year-round residence with a sales price greater than $10,000. We assume that the houses and neighborhoods in our sample have not experienced much change during the sample period-except for, a common time trend and, in some cases, consolidation.
Methodology
Compared with traditional regression analysis, matching methods have two key advantages for our study. First, matching methods introduce some of the advantages of a randomized experiment into a study based on observational data. Second, matching methods reduce the sensitivity of results to model-based and inherently untestable assumptions (Stuart and Rubin 2007) . Matching methods and regression-based model adjustments are not mutually exclusive, however. In fact, many scholars argue that the best approach is often to combine the two methods by conducting regression adjustment on balanced samples (Heckman et al. 1997 , Abadie and Imbens 2006 , Ho et al. 2007 ). The logic behind this combined empirical strategy is that the matching methods make it possible to reduce large covariate bias between the treated and control groups, and the traditional regression methods can be used to adjust for any residual bias and to increase efficiency (Stuart and Rubin 2007) .
Selection Problems and Sample Selection
Between 2000 For three reasons, the sample of parcels in the consolidating districts included in this analysis is not likely to be representative of the rest of the state. First, since relatively few districts in New York consolidate, despite generous financial incentives from the state, districts that do consolidate are not likely to be typical even of small districts in the state. Brasington (1999) found that differences in the student population increased the probability of consolidation, while differences in property values per pupil decreased this probability. Gordon and Knight (2009) found that increasing heterogeneity in the share of adults with a college degree and in district spending are negatively associated with the decision to merge. Second, only a small subset of houses experienced two sales from 2000 to 2012, which implies that these houses may not be representative of houses in the state. Third, we limit our sample in consolidating districts to only those with a sale before and after consolidation. As a result this study should be regarded as a case study about the impact on house values of three specific consolidations, not as a study about the impact of consolidation in general.
Another methodological challenge is that districts with certain unobserved housing or neighborhood traits may be more likely than others to consolidate. These types of unobservable factors might lead to biased estimates of the effects of consolidation on housing prices. To address this problem, we use dual sales data to estimate a difference-in-difference regression.
This approach accounts for time-invariant unobservable factors, but does not rule out the possibility of bias from changes in unobserved traits that are correlated with consolidation.
In addition, we used PSM to select a comparison group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group in terms of observable characteristics. Several steps are involved in finding a comparison group with PSM. 5 First, a set of "confounding" variables need to be identified; these variables should be related to both the treatment (the decision to buy/sell a house in a consolidating district) and the dependent variable (property value change). We selected a set of housing characteristics and neighborhood characteristics that are likely to be related to housing prices. These variables include income, property values, racial heterogeneity among enrolled students, and parental educational attainment, which have been found to be related to district consolidation decisions. 6 Model selection was based on both improving the fit of the model and finding a sample that meets the common support criteria. 7 As part of the process of finding a balanced sample, we explored the use of squared and interaction terms. Table 1 describes the variables used in the final PSM regression model.
The results of the PSM logistic regression are reported in Table 2 . Parcels in consolidating districts are more apt to be younger, in bad condition, have a higher grade of construction material, larger in terms of square feet and the number of bedrooms and bathrooms and to have central air conditioning. These homes are less apt to have a full basement and a fireplace, on average. Among census tract variables, the percent of adults with a BA or higher, the share of the population less than 20 years-old, and the share of owner occupied houses have a nonlinear relationship with the probability of being in a consolidating district (an inverted Ushape). The child poverty rate and percent of adults in profession or managerial occupations are negatively related to consolidation, while the share of low value houses (below $50k) and the share of employment in government are negatively related.
The PSM model was then used to develop propensity scores for a parcel being in a consolidating district. We first limit the sample to the area of common support by removing observations outside the region where the propensity scores of treatment and control observations overlap. This step reduced the number of dual sales by 10 percent in consolidating districts and by 5.8 percent in non-consolidating districts. With this trimmed sample, we identified comparison groups using several matching strategies. 8 We focus on the results from a 1-to-1 nearest neighbor match without replacement because best meets on the balancing tests 9 .
The matches are limited to a caliper around the propensity score for the treatment group member. 10 The result is a sample of 271 treatment and 271 comparison parcels 11 . Interestingly, more than half of the houses in this sample represent repeat sales in the consolidating districts in Albany or their matching partners in other areas. The unequal distribution of the sample reinforce the conclusion that our study cannot be interpreted as a general treatment of the impact of consolidation. We return to this issue when discussing our results.
The final step in developing a matching sample is checking the balance between the treatment and comparison parcels. The simplest approach is to compare mean values for each variable in the two groups. If the matched sample is balanced we should not see any statistically significant differences in the variables in the propensity score model or in the propensity score.
As indicated in 
Regression Models
To estimate the impact of consolidation on housing prices, we must first decide on the best way to set the date of a particular consolidation. For most districts, three official dates are associated with consolidation: 1) the date of the advisory referendum or filing of petitions; 2) the date of the official referendum on reorganization in each consolidating district; and 3) the actual date of consolidation. While advisory votes are common, they do not take place in all cases of consolidation and their results are non-binding. Instead, we think that the date of the official referendum or the start of the first school year in the consolidated districts are likely to frame the time when home owners of the district become aware that reorganization is taking place.
However, for the three consolidating districts in this paper, we find big time difference between these two dates ranging from six to eight months. Due to the time gap, we decided to use the date of the official referendum on reorganization as the start of consolidation 14 .
With a well matched sample it is possible to determine the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) by comparing the means of the treatment and comparison groups. Since our impact measure is the change in house sale price before and after consolidation, this would be equivalent to a difference-in-difference method (Guo and Fraser 2010; Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez, 2010) . While this approach has the potential to control for time-invariant unobservable differences across treatment and comparison, this comparison has some limitations in our case.
Under the classic difference-in-difference comparison the treatment is applied at the same time to all treatment group members and the pre-and post-observations are made at the same time.
Neither of these conditions is met in this study. Not all of the districts consolidated at the same time and very few of the house sales in our sample occurred on the same day.
To account for these timing differences, we developed a regression model for the matched sample. The dependent variable is the change in the log of house value. We calculated the months between the first sale and the starting date in our sample (January 1, 2000) , and between the second sale and the starting date. One control variable is the difference in months between these two measures (D) and a second is the difference in the squares of these two measures ( 2 D ). If t2 represents the time for the second sale, t1 the time for the first sale, and t0
represents the starting date (January 1, 2000), then these measures can be represented as:
D t t t t t t D t t t t
The second measure captures not only the time difference between the first and second sales but also where these sales fall relative to the beginning of the decade. Given recent changes in the housing market, it is important to control for the point in the decade when the sales occur.
Because the effects of consolidation on property values may take time to emerge, we also need to account for where the second sale occurred relative to date of consolidation. We devised measures similar to those in Equation (1) 
As discussed earlier, Hu and Yinger (2008) found that the impact of consolidation varies across districts and census tracts. Specifically, they found that the positive effects of consolidation on property values declines with enrollment and that the impact is the highest in low-property-value tracts. Given that the North Colonie CSD in Albany has substantially greater pre-consolidation enrollment than all other six consolidating school districts, we hypothesize that the impact of consolidation on property values is smaller in this district than elsewhere. To test this hypothesis, we interact the dichotomous variable for whether the district has consolidated (C) with a dummy variable for the large North Colonie CSD (L). We also test the Hu/Yinger finding that the property-value impact of consolidation is smaller in wealthier census tracts by interacting C with the average income in the census tract (I). In both cases, interactions with M and M 2 are included in the specification, as well. The two major models for the change in the log of property values (DV) can be represented as: 
We also estimate models with both interaction sets to see if these two effects can be separated. The initial impact of consolidation is positive (12.1 percent) but not statistically significant.
Impact Estimates
From that point on, however, the pattern in Model 2 arises, but in much stronger form. The estimated net effect of consolidation on house values in the six districts equals zero after about six months and then becomes negative and significant, reaching -26.8 percent after 31 months.
At this point the impact turns around, gets back to zero in 57 months, and then becomes positive.
At the largest post-consolidation time period observed in the data, 65 months, the impact of consolidation is positive, as in Hu and Yinger (2008) , but this impact, 18.7 percent, is not quite significant. In short, consolidation leads to a significant decline in house values for the first 2 ½ years, but this decline is then reversed and disappears by 5 years after consolidation takes place.
We believe that these results probably reflect two effects. First, people may be skeptical about consolidation, but then come to appreciate its cost savings and the broader sets of high school courses that tend to accompany it. Second, people who dislike consolidation may leave consolidating districts and be replaced by people who prefer it or who are willing to pay more to get it. We look for signs of sorting in the form of changes in the composition of local residents in consolidating districts, but substantial differences in demographic and economic characteristics across consolidating and non-consolidating areas have not appeared recently. One plausible explanation is that it may take a while for sorting to be noticeable. 16 These effects do not arise in
North Colonie because the consolidation we observe there represents a small change in district enrollment and because North Colonie was already so large before consolidation that further cost savings from economies of scale probably were not possible. Table 4 These income results are consistent with the findings of earlier studies but add a time path. As in Hu and Yinger, the ultimate impact of consolidation is to raise house values in lowincome tracts and to lower house values in high-income tracts. We also find, however, that the impact of consolidation on house values in low-income tracts is negative at first and only becomes positive after about five years. Moreover, the impact in high-income tracts is minimal at first but eventually becomes significantly negative. As discussed earlier, these patterns reflect some combination of changing views about consolidation as it is experienced and changes in the type of households living in consolidated districts. One possibility is that people in low-income tracts are particularly skeptical about consolidation at first but then come to appreciate its costs savings, whereas high-income people do not expect much from consolidation but eventually become discouraged by the loss of contact with teachers or by some other change that accompanies it. These finding also could reflect changes in the types of people who move into a district once it has consolidated.
Model 4 in
We also estimated models that included interactions with both the dummy for North
Colonie and initial tract income. Because North Colonie has a relatively high income, however, we were unable to separate these two sets of interactions. In other words, none of the interaction terms is significant in this specification. Thus, we cannot determine whether our results reflect variation in enrollment, variation in initial income, or some combination of the two. Additional research with larger data sets is needed to separate the impacts of these two factors.
Robustness Checks
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to differences in the sample, estimation method, and matching algorithm. 17, 18 Tables 5 and 6 The second alternative is to include propensity scores as weights in a weighted regression model (Steiner and Cook forthcoming; Guo and Fraser 2010) . The advantage of this approach is that we are able to use all treatment and comparison observations in the area of common support. The disadvantage is that results can be sensitive to outliers (i.e., propensity scores close to zero). Finally, because impact estimates with PSM can also be sensitive to the matching algorithm, we also looked at several other matching strategies, and some of them passed balancing tests. In the sample selected by 1-to-5 nearest neighbor matching, for example, none of the variables is significantly different between the treatment group and control groups. Table 4 . The magnitudes and significance of the variables are similar across the 4 columns of this panel.
As a final check, we looked at the distribution of predicted sales prices changes from Model 4 using these different methodologies. As shown in Table 6 , the results are quite similar.
The median predicted house value change, for example, ranges from -2.83 percent (the fourth column) to -4.53 percent (the second column).
Conclusions
This paper explores the impact of school district consolidation on house values using a sample of house sales in New York State from 2000 to 2012. During this period, three sets of districts consolidated. We use propensity score matching to identify house sales that are comparable to the sales in these districts and then use double-sales data to compare house value changes in consolidating and comparable districts.
We find that, on average, consolidation has a small negative impact on house values, at least outside of districts that are relatively large before consolidation. This average impact This pattern appears to reflect some combination of learning about the consequences of consolidation and differences in the preference of households who move into districts before and after they consolidate. With the data available to us, however, we cannot test these hypotheses about the pattern of house value effects or separate the impact on this pattern of initial district enrollment and of initial neighborhood income. These are topics for future research. http://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/sales/localoff.htm (acc. December 10, 2013).
More information on the house characteristics used in this analysis can be found in the
Assessor's Manual produced by NYDTFe [Online] http://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/manuals/assersmanual.htm (acc. Dec. 10, 2013).
Information on the RPS data comes from NYDTF [Online]
http://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/rps/index.htm (accessed December 10, 2013).
4. In all three cases one district annexed the other district(s), but voters in all districts approved.
For more information on consolidation, see the NYSED (2013).
5. For more on PSM see Guo and Fraser (2010) , Steiner and Cook (forthcoming), Heinrich, Maffioli and Vazquez (2010) , Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) , and Becker and Ichino (2002) .
6. We also estimate a propensity score model that includes local revenue effort (= local revenues divided by property value), since it may be related to the impacts of consolidation. This approach leads to a sample of 482 observations and to a significant impact estimate (-7.25 percent, significant at the 1 percent level), but this sample fails one key balancing test.
7. See Heinrich, Maffioli and Vazquez (2010) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) for more on strategies for variable selection. Models with variables measuring differences between districts and their neighbors in demographics, fiscal capacity, and student need explained over 90 percent of the probability that a parcel was in a consolidating district, but led to little overlap in propensity scores between treatment and comparison groups.
8. We conduct the matching using the STATA program"psmatch2" developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and explained by Guo and Fraser (2010) .
9. We also tried 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching with replacement, which resulted in a reduction of 40 observations. The new sample passed the standardized bias test but not the t-test;
results based on it indicate that consolidation, on average, lowered housing price by 2.98 percent (significant at 6.3 percent level)-a result that is similar to the one in Table 4. 10. Guo and Fraser (2010) recommend using a caliper of 0.25 standard deviations for the log of the odds ratio from the logistic regression (log(P/(1-P), where P is the propensity score). We set a tougher standard by limiting matches to within 0.15 standard deviations.
11. We deleted a few (13 observations) outliers because they experienced large changes in housing traits. For example, some of them installed central air conditioning system during the time between the first sale and the second sale; some expanded the square feet of living area; and some "unreasonably "experienced more than a 50 percent price change within one month.
12. See Ho et al. (2007) and Stuart and Rubin (2008) for a discussion of this approach. Ho et al. (2007) are critical of using hypothesis testing to check balance and prefer quantile-quantile (QQ)
plots. This alternative test could be attempted in future research.
13. Another test suggested by Sianesi (2004) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) is to determine whether the pseudo-2 and likelihood ratio chi-square statistic for the propensity score regression are significantly smaller for the matched sample than for the sample as a whole. We implemented this test using the Stata "pstest" program of Leuven and Sianesi (2003) . Compared to the full sample, the pseudo-2 for the matched sample decreases from 0.419 to 0.068 and the likelihood ratio chi-square declines from 1466.9 to 51 but is still significant. The matched sample also passes this test with 1:5 nearest-neighbor matching and kernel matching but not with Mahalanobis matching. Because these results are ambiguous and this test has no obvious advantages over others, we rely on the balancing on the tests presented in the text.
14. We prefer the date of the official referendum as the consolidation date for two reasons. (1669) overall. This is consistent with results based on price alone.
18. A reviewer also suggested that our results might be biased by the inclusion of real-estate owned (REO) properties and foreclosure sales. A decline in price for these houses cannot be simply attributed to a change in the demographics of their community or to residents' perceptions about consolidation. We find that only 6 houses (1.13% of our sample) are in the category "conditional government sale" in which distressed sales are likely to fall. After eliminating these 6 cases, the consolidation coefficient becomes -0.029 (p-value = 0.056),
suggesting that houses in this category have little impact on our results.
19. Following Dinardo (2002) , we also calculate both average treatment effects (ATE) and average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) on the full sample; the estimated effects of consolidation are -4.1 percent and -6.5 percent, respectively. Since this approach is sensitive to extreme low or high values of the propensity score (PS), we also estimate our model after deleting observations with a PS below 0.1 or above 0.9. The estimated effects are -7.9 percent and -6.5 percent. These results are consistent with those in the text, but assume, incorrectly in our case, that all consolidations happen at the same time.
20. The five closest comparison group observations within the caliper (0.15 standard deviations)
are matched with each treatment group member. The final sample was 764 comparison group members and 271 treatment group members. This matching was done with replacement using the "psmatch2" Stata program developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) . The full sample was limited to the area of common support before the matching was done. Sample 1 is based on 1:1 nearest neighbor matching within a caliper set at 0.15 standard deviation of the log of the odds ratio. Sampling is done without replacement. is change in log of sales price. Sample size is 529. Estimated with OLS regression with robust standard errors. Significance levels are in parentheses. All regression models include as control variables the propensity score, the difference in months between first and second sale and the difference in months between first and second sales squared. *The large school district indicates the North Colonie CSD in Albany which has 5,464 students before consolidation, much larger than 772 students, the average pre-consolidation enrollment level of all other school districts in our sample. The coefficients of three interaction terms for that large school district are -0.0256, 0.0016 and -0.0000, respectively; none of them is significant. ** The income variable is de-meaned in order to make the results of Model 4 comparable to those of other models. 
